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  We propose an index of the fiscal stance that is convenient for practical 
use. It is based on a finite time horizon, not on an infinite time horizon like 
most tests. As it employs VAR analysis it is simple to compute and easily 
automated. We also show how it is possible to analyse a change of policy within 
a VAR framework. We use this methodology to examine the effect on fiscal 
sustainability of a change in policy. We then conduct an empirical examination 
of the fiscal stances of the US, the UK and Germany over the last 25 or more 
years, and we carry out a counter-factual analysis of the likely consequences for 
fiscal sustainability of using a Taylor rule to set monetary policy over this 
period. Among our findings are that the recent fiscal stances of all three 
countries are not sustainable, and that using a Taylor rule in the past would 
have improved the fiscal stances of the US and UK, but not that of Germany. 
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 1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Recent concerns in 2004 and 2005 about the ﬁscal stances of the US, France and Germany and of
possible reforms to the EU’s Stability and Growth Pact (largely due to the errant ﬁscal positions
of France and Germany) have renewed interest in the issue of how to measure ﬁscal sustainability.
In this paper we provide a critical review the literature on ﬁscal sustainability much of which is
at least a decade old. We then propose a new way of measuring ﬁscal sustainability that avoids
most of the limitations of those proposed in the literature. We use this to re-examine the ﬁscal
stances of the US, the UK and Germany.
Determining whether a current ﬁscal stance is sustainable has proved both diﬃcult and highly
controversial. The Stability and Growth Pact attempts to resolve the problem by setting limits
on the ratios of the government deﬁcit to GDP and government debt to GDP. Such rules are,
however, far too restrictive. Moreover, they can be shown to be neither necessary nor suﬃcient to
achieve ﬁscal sustainability: a country could breach these limits and still have a sustainable ﬁscal
policy, or it could satisfy the limits but not have a sustainable ﬁscal policy.
It is generally agreed that a ﬁscal stance is sustainable if it satisﬁes the government’s inter-
temporal budget constraint. In practice, this does not solve the problem either as the inter-
temporal budget constraint is forward-looking over an inﬁnite horizon. Most of the literature
on ﬁscal sustainability focuses on past deﬁcits and debts, but a government may attempt to
circumvent such assessments by announcing the intention to oﬀset current deﬁcits and debts by
generating future surpluses. This raises the question of whether such announcements are credible
given the performance and structure of the economy. To answer this one would need a measure
of the sustainability of the current ﬁscal stance based on a model of the economy.
In this paper we propose an index of the sustainability of the current ﬁscal stance derived from
the inter-temporal budget constraint. The index is based on a comparison of the existing level of
government debt with a forecast of the present value of current and future deﬁcits and surpluses
1derived from a simple VAR forecasting model of the economy. The time horizon for the present
value is a matter of choice; it can be ﬁnite or inﬁnite. The index is calculated as the ratio of this
present value to the existing level of debt. If the index exceeds unity then the current ﬁscal stance
is sustainable; if it is less than unity then a change in the ﬁscal stance must be considered.
The main attraction of this index is that it is easy to compute each period in a mechanical
way, and it can be tailored to any time horizon. From a theoretical point of view it has a number
of important advantages over existing procedures for determining ﬁscal sustainablility. It is more
informative and general than simply looking at whether deﬁcits and debts are stationary or non-
stationary processes, or whether the deﬁcit and debt are cointegrated. The greater generality
arises from not assuming that interest rates, inﬂation and GDP growth are constant either in
the past or over the forecast period, or that they may change but in a rigid predetermined way.
Instead, all three variables are modelled in the VAR together with government expenditures, tax
revenues and debt.
If the index indicates a lack of ﬁscal sustainability then a policy change may be required. It
would then be desirable to know whether a particular policy change would achieve sustainability.
The problem is that a policy switch would alter the model of the economy. This is known as
the Lucas Critique. In a VAR forecasting model every equation would be aﬀected. We therefore
propose a new way to adjust a VAR forecasting model following a change to one of its equations
that eliminates this problem for a VAR. As a result, we are able to compare ﬁscal sustainability
under diﬀerent ﬁscal and monetary policy regimes such as a move from discretionary to rules-based
policies, or a change in policy rule.
Our main empirical ﬁndings are that during the period of strong economic growth in the 1990’s
the ﬁscal positions of the US, the UK and Germany improved considerably, but in recent years
the ﬁscal stance in all three countries has been steadily deteriorating. Our index indicates that a
continuation of the present ﬁscal stances is leading to ﬁscal unsustainability in the three countries.
We have shown that the German ﬁscal position has worsened steadily over the last thirty years
2with only a brief respite in the mid 1990’s and a sharp deterioration occurred after uniﬁcation and
again on joining EMU.
The paper is set out as follows. In Section 2 we examine a number of diﬀerent ways of
writing the government budget constraint and establish our notation. In Section 3 we analyse the
conditions required for ﬁscal sustainability and provide an intuitive rationale for the various tests
that have been proposed in the literature. We show that these tests have two main problems:
due to the discount rate being time-varying, the analysis of ﬁscal sustainability is a non-linear
problem; the tests relate to the very long run and hence are of limited practical use for short-term
decision making. We address the ﬁrst problem in Section 4 where we propose the use of a log-linear
approximation to the government budget constraint. This enables linear methods of analysis to
be used once more. And in Section 5 we propose a measure of the ﬁscal stance appropriate for
the short run and show how this can implemented using VAR analysis. In Section 6 we explain
how it is possible to use the same VAR after some of the original equations have replaced by
new equations. We then show how this new methodology enables us to analyse the eﬀect on
ﬁscal sustainability of switching monetary policy to using a Taylor rule. Our empirical results are
presented in Section 7 and our ﬁndings are summarized in Section 8.
2 The government budget constraint
We begin by considering the nominal government budget constraint (GBC), the sustainability of
ﬁscal policy and the implications of various ﬁscal rules, such as the EU’s Stability and Growth
Pact.1 The nominal GBC can be written
Ptgt +( 1+Rt)Bt−1 = Bt + ∆Mt + PtTt (1)
1 There is a substantial literature on these issues. Most of it goes back some way in time. See, for example,
Hamilton and Flavin (1986), Trehan and Walsh (1988, 1991), Kremers (1989), Wilcox (1989), Blanchard, Chouraqui,
Hagemann and Sartor (1990), Bohn (1991, 1992, 1995, 1998, 2005), Hakkio and Rush (1991), Buiter, Corsetti and
Roubini (1993), Ahmed and Rogers (1995) and Wickens and Uctum (2000). There is also a related literature on
current account sustainability, see Wickens and Uctum (1993).
3where gt is real government expenditure including real transfers to households, Tt is total real
taxes and Mt is the stock of outside nominal, non-interest bearing money in circulation that is
supplied by the government (the central bank) at the start of period t, Bt is the nominal value of
government bonds issued at the end of period t, Rt is the average interest rate on bonds issued
at the end of period t − 1 and RtBt−1 is total interest payments made in period t.2 Thus the
left-hand side of equation (1) is total nominal expenditures in period t and the right-hand side is
total revenues plus additions to government current ﬁnancial resources.
The equivalent real GBC can be derived from the nominal GBC by dividing through the






















where πt = ∆Pt
Pt−1 i st h er a t eo fi n ﬂation, bt is the real stock of government debt, mt is the real




and implying that approximately rt ' Rt − πt.
The GBC can also be expressed in terms of proportions of nominal or real GDP by dividing























where γt i st h er a t eo fg r o w t ho fG D Pa n dTt
yt is the average tax rate.
2 In practice governments issue bonds at a discount and redeem them at par. Thus if all bonds were for one
period, then Bt = PB
t BG
t where BG





4The total nominal government deﬁcit (or public sector borrowing requirement, PSBR) is de-
ﬁned as
PtDt = Ptgt + RtBt−1 − PtTt − ∆Mt
hence Dt



























(1 + πt)(1 + γt)
bt−1
yt−1
T h er i g h t - h a n ds i d es h o w st h en e tb o r r o w i n gr e q u i r e dt of u n dt h ed e ﬁcit expressed as a proportion
of GDP.
We also deﬁne the nominal primary deﬁcit Ptdt (the total deﬁcit less debt interest payments)
as









(1 + πt)(1 + γt)
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This is a non-linear diﬀerence equation in bt
yt.I fw ed e ﬁne
1+ρt =
1+Rt
(1 + πt)(1 + γt)
where approximately, ρt = Rt − πt − γt = rt − γt, the real interest rate adjusted for economic










5This is the key equation for determining the sustainability of ﬁscal policy. We note that the
evolution of bt












For positive inﬂation and growth this is a stable diﬀerence equation
3 Fiscal sustainability
Fiscal sustainablity concerns the evolution of bt
yt and whether it remains ﬁnite or explodes. The
ﬁscal stance is said to be sustainable if bt
yt is ﬁnite, and if ﬁnancial markets are willing to hold the
level of debt that emerges. Before describing our proposed new procedure for determining whether
the ﬁscal stance is sustainable, we review the principal methods available in the literature. All
take equation (5) as their starting point. In discussing sustainability it is convenient to distinguish
between two cases: where the discount rate ρt (and hence Rt,πt and γt) is assumed to be constant
and where it is allowed to be time varying.3
3.1 Constant discount rate
If ρt is assumed to be constant then from equation (5) bt











where 1+ρ = 1+R
(1+π)(1+γ) or, approximately, ρ = R − π − γ.T h e s o l u t i o n f o r bt
yt depends on
whether the equation (7) is stable or unstable. We consider both cases.
Case1: ρ<0 (stable case)
3 Ahmed and Rogers (1995) and Bohn (1995, 2005) argue that the appropriate discount rate to use for discounting
future primary surpluses is the inter-temporal marginal rate of substitution and not the real interest rate. In a
complete markets full general equilibrium model this would be the real rate of return used here.
6In this case 1+R
(1+π)(1+γ) < 1 and equation (7) is a stable diﬀerence equation, and hence can
be solved backwards by successive substitution. The expected value of the debt-GDP ratio in n



































The evolution of the debt-GDP ratio depends on that of dt
yt. Suppose that dt
yt may be stochastic


































if λ =0 (12)
If ρ,λ < 0 then limn→∞ Et(
bt+n
yt+n)=0and it will explode if λ>0. Thus, the debt-GDP ratio
will remain ﬁnite and positive if the ratio of the primary surplus to GDP (−dt
yt)d o e sn o te x p l o d e .
We note that if λ<0 then dt
yt is a stationary I(0) process and the expected, or long-run, value of
the debt-GDP ratio is zero. And if λ =0 ,t h e ndt
yt is a non-stationary I(1) process, and hence bt
yt
will also be I(1). Moreover, bt
yt and dt
yt will be cointegrated with cointegrating vector (1, 1
ρ).F i s c a l
policy is therefore sustainable provided bt
yt does not grow over time.
7Case 2: ρ>0 (unstable case)
In this case 0 <
(1+π)(1+γ)
1+R < 1 and equation (7) is an unstable diﬀerence equation and hence











































We note that the right-hand side of equation (15) is the expected present value of current and
future primary surpluses expressed as a proportion of GDP. This condition implies that current
and future surpluses will be suﬃcient to pay-oﬀ current debt.
Suppose once more that dt

















) if − 1 <λ<ρ , ρ>0
Thus, provided that the current level of the debt-GDP ratio does not exceed the right-hand side,
ﬁscal policy is sustainable and the debt-GDP ratio will grow at the rate λ,t h es a m er a t ea s−dt
yt .
If −dt
yt is stationary then −1 <λ<0 and bt
yt will also be stationary. If λ =0 ,s ot h a t−dt
yt is











yt will be I(1) and cointegrated with −dt
yt .
8These results can be compared with a number of well-known empirical tests for ﬁscal sustain-
ability and provide some insight into the rationale behind the tests. The test of Hamilton and
Flavin (1986) is based on the following version of equation (13)
bt
yt









except that real debt and the real primary deﬁcit is used rather than bt
yt and dt
yt. A0 =0on the
null hypothesis that the transversality condition holds.
Trehan and Walsh (1988) propose a cointegration test for ﬁscal sustainability. They measure
debt and the primary deﬁcit in real terms rather than as proportions of GDP, but Hakkio and
Rush (1991) employ the test expressing the variables as proportions of GDP. If the variables have
unit roots and are cointegrated with cointegrating vector (ρ,1) then ﬁscal policy is sustainable.
(Or, if government expenditures and revenues are I(1), then the cointegrating vector with debt
must be (ρ,1,−1).) This result follows immediately from equations (12) and (17). Alternatively,















It follows that bt
yt has a unit root if α = ρ.
3.2 Time-varying discount rate
In practice, ρt will be time-varying, not constant, and so these tests will in general be invalid. We



























≤ 1 for all s≥ 1
























Like equation (15), equation (20) says that the present value of current and future primary sur-
pluses must be suﬃcient to oﬀset current debt liabilities. The diﬀerence is that the discount rate
is compounded from time-varying rates.







We may now write equation (5) as
∆xt = zt









Wilcox (1989) shows that ﬁscal sustainability is satisﬁed if xt is a zero-mean stationary process.
Uctum and Wickens (2000) prove a more general result that does not require xt to be stationary.
They show that ﬁscal sustainability is satisﬁed if zt is a zero-mean stationary process when it
follows that xt will be an I(1) process. Trehan and Walsh (1991) argue that ﬁscal policy is
sustainable with a variable discount rate if the total deﬁcit is stationary. This result follows
10directly from equation (6). As it is a stable diﬀerence equation if nominal growth is positive, bt
yt
is ﬁnite (and stationary) if
Dt+s
yt+s is stationary.
3.3 Stability and Growth Pact (SGP)
The SGP was based on the original Maastricht conditions that bt
yt must be less than 0.6 and Dt
yt
must be less than 0.03. For given maximum values for bt
yt and Dt




(1 + π)(1 + γ)

















fall. Further, for given bt
yt and Dt
yt nominal growth must satisfy





It can now be shown that the SGP conditions on debts and deﬁcits are neither necessary,
nor suﬃcient for ﬁscal sustainability. To show insuﬃciency, given the limits on debt and deﬁcits
speciﬁed under the SGP, the nominal rate of growth must not be less than 0.03
0.6 ≡ 5%. If nominal
growth were less than this then debt would rise above 60% even if the deﬁcit limit were satisﬁed.
To show that the SGP does not provide necessary conditions, we note that even if the deﬁcit
or debt limits were exceeded, there is a rate of nominal growth would be consistent with ﬁscal
sustainability. For example, if the deﬁcit exceeds 3% it is still possible for the debt-GDP ratio to
satisfy the 60% limit if nominal growth exceeds 5%. And if the debt-GDP ratio exceeds 60%,
3.4 Assessment
These measures of ﬁscal sustainability are of limited practicality. First, it is necessary to fore-
cast future deﬁcits, inﬂation, growth and interest rates in order to compute the present value of
expected future deﬁcits. It may sometimes be possible to use oﬃcial forecasts as in Uctum and
11Wickens (2000). If these are not available, or to provide an independent check, other means must
be found to construct the forecasts. A structural economic model is a possibility, but has the dis-
advantage of embodying prior information that may prove contentious and diﬃcult for outsiders
to replicate. In view of this, in this paper we propose using a VAR to provide the forecasts. This
has the merit of being easily understood and replicable.
Second, the time horizon in these tests is so distant that the tests provide an ineﬀective
constraint on ﬁscal policy in the short run. Like Uctum and Wickens (2000) we therefore examine
ﬁscal sustainability over a much shorter, ﬁnite, time horizon.
Third, and related to the second point; a government running persistent, and even large
deﬁcits, may simply claim that they expect, or will generate, oﬀsetting surpluses at some point in
the future. It is therefore desirable to be able to evaluate ﬁscal sustainability under alternative
policies. In general, this cannot be accomplished in a VAR by simply replacing some of the
equations (for example, by the new policy rules) and leaving the others unaltered, as all equations
are aﬀected. We therefore devise a valid way to do this, creating a new VAR from the old.
Fourth, since the main policy instruments are interest rates and taxes, and the present value
condition is a nonlinear function of these, we recast the analysis of ﬁscal sustainability in the form
of a model linear in logarithms. It is then straightfoward to relate the present value calculation
to the VAR, and to incorporate changes to the structure of the VAR.
Fifth, by comparing the projected outcome for the debt-GDP ratio constructed in this way over
any given time horizon with its initial level, we are able to provide an index of the current ﬁscal
stance and, by altering policy rules, of any other policy stance. In this way policy comparisons
may be made.
Taken together, we believe these changes to standard practice constitute a considerable ad-
vance. Moreover, as the whole procedure can easily by automated, it has the potential to become
a standard descriptive statistic for the ﬁscal stance.
124 A log-linear approach to ﬁscal sustainability
4.1 The log-linearized GBC
The ﬁrst step is to log-linearize the government budget constraint. As the primary deﬁcit can
take negative values, it is necessary to write the GBC in terms of total expenditures gt and total























(1 + πt)(1 + γt)
mt−1
yt−1
Next we approximate the GBC about the steady-state solution in which we assume that all










T h eG B Cm a yb er e - w r i t t e na s













Noting that a ﬁrst-order Taylor series approximation to h(xt)=e x p [ l nxt] about lnx is
h(xt)=x[1 + (lnxt − lnx)]



































− (1 + ρ)ln(1+ρ)
As ln(1 + ρt) ' ρt,i ne ﬀect the discount rate is an additional variable in the equation. Thus, by
employing a log-linear transformation of the GBC, we may analyse ﬁscal sustainability when the
13deﬁcit and discount rate are time-varying using, once more, a constant coeﬃcient linear diﬀerence
equation.
Whether the diﬀerence equation is a stable or unstable depends on the sign of ρ.A s s u m i n g











































If kt is stationary then ln bt
yt, and hence bt
yt,r e m a i n sﬁnite and stationary. This may occur
due to the individual terms of kt being stationary, or due to some terms being I(1) but being
cointegrated with the appropriate contegrating vector given by the coeﬃcients in the deﬁnition of
c.
4.2 Fiscal sustainability over a ﬁnite time horizon
S of a rw eh a v ed i s c u s s e dﬁscal sustainability over an inﬁnite time horizon. This could remove
m u c ho ft h ei m m e d i a t er e l e v a n c eo ft h ei s s u ea sﬁscal correction could be deferred to a distant
future. Using a ﬁnite time horizon would avoid this. Suppose that the time horizon is n periods.
Equations (8), (13) and (18) show the evolution of bt
yt over this horizon and equation (22) shows
the evolution of ln bt
yt. Wickens and Uctum (2000) argued that such equations can be used to
determine whether projected values of the primary surplus and discount rate are consistent with
the desired change in the debt-GDP ratio, or in the discounted debt-GDP ratio. We are now able
to improve on this by endogenising the primary surplus and the discount rate forecasts.
144.3 An index of sustainability
The use of an index of sustainability was initially proposed by Blanchard, Chouraqui, Hagemann,
and Sartor (1990) and Buiter, Corsetti and Roubini (1993). Their indices are based on a compar-
ison of the current debt-GDP ratio and that n periods ahead with given ﬁxed values of the deﬁcit
and discount rate. We generalize this, allowing the deﬁcit and discount rate to be time-varying
and endogenous, and the target level of the debt-GDP ratio to be a choice variable.
Equation (25) is the logarithmic equivalent of the earlier result that ﬁscal policy is sustainable













which can be interpreted as determining in logarithmic terms the present value of primary deﬁcits
required to achieve an expected change in discounted debt. If we replace Et[ln
bt+n
yt+n] by a target
level ln(
bt+n
yt+n)∗ then we can determine whether future values of kt are consistent with satisfying a













A measure of sustainability may be constructed by comparing the two sides of equation (26).
If, for example, the aim is to decrease discounted debt then the left-hand side will be negative
and the right-hand side gives the present value of the primary surplus required to achieve this
reduction in debt. An increase in discounted debt requires a lower primary surplus. We therefore












−s Et(kt+s) R 0
15Our proposed measure of ﬁscal sustainability is













Thus the index provides a comparison with the current level of the debt-GDP ratio. As n →∞
the ﬁrst term in lnKt,n tends to zero and the index can be interpreted as comparing the the
existing level of the debt-GDP ratio with the resources to pay it oﬀ.
The index may be interpreted as follows:
(i) if FSI(t,n)=1the debt-GDP ratio is forecast to be on target
(ii) if FSI(t,n) > 1 the debt-GDP ratio is forecast to be below target
(iii) if FSI(t,n) < 1 the debt-GDP ratio is forecast to be above target.
Only in case (iii) is the forecasted present value of the primary surplus insuﬃcient to achieve
the desired change in the debt-GDP ratio. In this case the current ﬁscal stance would not be
sustainable.
In practice, the special case considered by Buiter and Blanchard of maintaining a constant









−s Et(kt+s) R 0
The index of ﬁscal sustainability then becomes














This is the case we consider below.
16We note that in the special case of achieving a constant debt-GDP ratio over an n−period










































where the numerator is now proportional to the present value of primary surpluses. We use the
previous method of calculating the index, equation (27).
4.4 Forecasting the ﬁscal variables












,ln(1 + ρt),ln(1 + γt),ln(1 + πt)
¶
Later we add two variables to this vector. This is explained below. We propose the use of a
VAR(p) to obtain these forecasts. This is a simple forecasting scheme that is easily implemented
and is theory free. Given the VAR
zt = A0 +
p X
i=1
Aizt−i + et, (28)
where et ∼ i.i.d.[0,Σ]. The vector of variables zt may be I(0) or I(1). For forecasting purposes it
is unnecessary to take account any non-stationarity or cointegration among the variables. Equally,
if cointegration exists, a cointegrated VAR could be estimated instead of a levels VAR and the
17cointegrated VAR could then be written in levels to obtain (28). We also note that to improve
the forecasts zt may contain additional variables to those that appear in the budget constraint.
n−period ahead forecasts may be obtained using the companion form
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Expressing kt as the following linear function of zt
kt = a + β
0zt


















BiB0 + BsZt)]} − ln
bt
yt
As the last term ln bt
yt is also a linear function of Zt, FS(t,n) could just be written as
FS(t,n)=an + b0
nZt
18where an is a scalar dependent on the time horizon and bn is a vector. This emphasizes that
FS(t,n) is predetermined, being based solely on information available at time t. Thus, increasing
the forecast horizon alters an and bn but not Zt.
To implement this in practice it will be necessary to estimate an and bn from the VAR
estimates. The choice of ρ and c could be based, for example, on the average values in the sample,
their time t values or their average values over the forecast period. A time series for FS(t,n)
could be calculated from the sample either using all of the sample observations to estimate the
VAR, or recursively using only observations up to period t.
5E v a l u a t i n g ﬁscal sustainability under alternative policy
rules
Finding that ﬁscal sustainability is not satisﬁed may prompt a change of policy. But before
adopting a new policy it would be helpful to estimate its likely eﬀect on ﬁscal sustainability.
Moreover, it is desirable to do this using the same theory-free VAR framework. The problem
is that, in general, a change of policy would alter the VAR. As a result, the VAR based on the
historic data would be invalid for carrying out the evaluation of the new policy. In this section
we show how this problem may be overcome, and how a VAR may still be used to analyze ﬁscal
sustainability. The methodology is based on Wickens (2004, 2005).
Consider the VAR, equation (28), which we re-write as
zt = A(L)zt−1 + et
where for convenience we set A0 =0 , A(L)=
Pp
i=1 AiL
i and L is the lag operator such that
zt−s = Lszt. Suppose that the policy change consists of determining one or more policy variables




2t).W ew i s ht of o r man e wV A Rb a s e do nr e p l a c i n gt h eo l de q u a t i o n s
for z2t. But we cannot simply substitute the new equations for the old as this would also alter the
19correlation structure of the disturbances of the VAR model.
If we partition the original disturbances et conformably as e0
t =( e0
1t,e 0
2t), the problem can be
reformulated as being due to e1t and e2t being contemporaneously correlated. This implies that
if the VAR equations for the policy instruments arec h a n g e dt h e nt h ec o r r e l a t i o ns t r u c t u r eo ft h e
VAR errors will change too. If the original errors were uncorrelated there would be no problem.
We therefore seek a way of replacing the equation for the policy instruments so that the correlation
structure of the VAR errors is unaﬀected. This can be accomplished if we transform the VAR
equations for z1t into a VAR that is conditional on the current value of the policy instrument.
To do this we deﬁne the linear function
e1t = εt + Ge2t


























In other words, we are applying a block Choleski decomposition to the the original VAR residuals.
































































with the result that the disturbances associated with z1t are uncorrelated with those of z2t
H−1zt = H−1A(L)zt−1 + H−1et
Partitioning A(L) conformably,
z1t =[ A11(L) − GA21(L)]z1,t−1 + Gz2t +[ A12(L) − GA22(L)]z2,t−1 + εt
z2t = A21(L)z1,t−1 + A22(L)z2t + e2t
The reason that z2t appears in the new equation for z1t is because e1t and e2t are correlated. This
implies that z2t aﬀects z1t contemporaneously. As εt and e2t are uncorrelated, the new equation
for z1t can be described as a conditional VAR as it is a VAR in which z2t is exogenous.
Only at this stage do we replace the equation for z2t by the new policy rule. Suppose this
takes the general form








2t would all be zero.

















































































































We have now constructed a new VAR that can be used for policy analysis. We can, for example,
perform impulse response analysis on this VAR in the usual way. We can forecast under the policy
change, and we can carry out counter-factual analysis examining how the economy would have
behaved in the past under a change of policy, see Wickens (2005).
We note that the response of z1t to εt in the new VAR must take account of the fact that we
have carried out a transformation of the disturbances. Thus in the original VAR ∂z1t
∂εt = I but in
the new VAR ∂z1t
∂εt = I − F(I + FG)−1G. Thus under the new policy rule the response of z1t to
εt is diﬀerent. We also note that now z2t will in general respond to εt.
We have not discussed whether the variables are stationary or non-stationary, and if diﬀerence
stationary whether cointegrating relations exist. Such distinctions are not of much relevance in
using a VAR purely for forecasting. If the data are I ( 1 )a n dc o i n t e g r a t e dt h e naV A Ri nl e v e l sw i l l
implicitly, and hence automatically, take account of any cointegration. Nonetheless, it would be
straightforward to start by estimating a cointegrated VAR, re-write this in levels and then proceed
as described above using a VAR in levels.
To summarize, if we wish to analyze the eﬀect of a change in policy rule within a VAR
framework, we construct an estimate of the VAR of the response variables that is conditional on
the policy instrument and then combine this with the new policy rule to form a complete system.
The conditional VAR can be constructed as a linear transformation of the original VAR. The
transformation matrix is estimated from the covariance matrix of the original VAR. We can then
derive a new VAR from the completed model. In Wickens (2005) it is shown how to derive the
policy rule optimally from the VAR.
22It is straightfoward to apply this to ﬁscal sustainability. In principle, we simply construct the
new VAR as described and then calculate FS(t,n) as before using the new VAR. In practice,
there is one further problem. We propose to examine the eﬀect on ﬁscal sustainability of using
a monetary rule. The policy instrument for this is the short rate. Rt is not, however, the short
rate, but is the eﬀective rate on total government debt. Total debt consists of bonds of diﬀerent
maturities and so the eﬀective rate of return is an implicit weighted average of rates on each
maturity, weighted by the number of bonds issued at each maturity. We therefore include the
nominal short rate rst as an additional variable in the VAR. Further, to help forecast Rt we also
include a nominal long rate rlt in the VAR. The long rate is, of course, aﬀected by the short rate
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6 Empirical results
6.1 The United states
The data for the US are quarterly for the period 1960.1 to 2005.4. The data sources and the
construction of the variables are described in the Appendix. We note that debt is measured as net
liabilities. This is diﬀerent from the Maastricht deﬁnition of debt but, given the deﬁnitions of the







yt ,R t,πt,γt,ρ t.T h eﬁrst four variables are expressed as percentages
of GDP and the last four are annualised percentages.







































Figure 1: US data
In Table 1 we report Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests for these variables using up to 6 lags. We








y ln(1 + R)l n ( 1 + pi) ρ ∆lnyt
6 -1.280 -2.305 -2.127 -1.656 -1.984 -1.515 -5.347**
5 -1.734 -2.341 -2.089 -1.749 -2.031 -1.633 -5.415**
4 -2.156 -2.462 -2.076 -1.750 -1.927 -1.774 -5.947**
3 -1.197 -2.836 -2.062 -1.496 -1.704 -1.638 -5.481**
2 -0.7304 -2.511 -2.102 -1.324 -1.896 -2.082 -6.262**
1 -0.8553 -1.996 -1.952 -1.312 -2.375 -2.628 -6.882**
0 -0.4945 -1.824 -2.316 -1.270 -3.098* -3.825** -9.950**
Note: * denotes signiﬁcance at the 5% level and ** denotes signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
24As we are using the VAR only for forecasting we estimate a VAR in levels of the variables and
ignore any possible cointegration arising from the variables that have unit roots. Under sustainable
ﬁscal policies we would expect to ﬁnd cointegration, and the cointegrating vector would just be
the long-run budget constraint. For space reasons we do not report the VAR estimates, but we
note that a lag of 6 produces serially uncorrelated residuals.
In calculating the present values we require values for v
b,
g
b and ρ.W e e s t i m a t e b, g and ρ
using their sample averages. Table 2 gives the average values for Germany, the UK and the US.
Table 2
bgvρ
Germany 0.290 0.447 0.459 0.041
United Kingdom 0.352 0.405 0.435 0.086
United States 0.423 0.308 0.331 0.054
Note: b, g and ρ are sample averages, v is constructed from the steady-state equation v = g + ρb
We examine ﬁscal sustainability based a constant target debt-GDP ratio for three horizons:
one-year, two-years and ﬁve-years ahead. For each horizon we present four ﬁgures. Figures 2.1, 2.2
and 2.5 are plots of the ﬁscal sustainability index, FSI(n). Figures 3-5 give various breakdowns
of the index into its component parts. Thus, Figures 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3 are plots of lnbt
yt and the
forecast logarithm of the present value of current and future primary surpluses, lnKt,n,w h i c hw e
denote in the graph by EPVGBC(n). There are three components to FS(t,n): the desired change
in discounted debt PVdb(n), the present value of the primary surplus PVs(n) and the term for
the discount factor, PVrho(n). These are plotted in Figures 4.1, 4.2 and 4.5. An indication of the
beneﬁt of using a log-linear model is given by the extent to which PVrho(n) diﬀers from unity.
Finally, in Figures 5.1, 5.2 and 5.5 we plot the two components of PVs(n). These are the present
value of revenues PVv(n) and of expenditures PVg(n).
(i) One-year horizon









Figure 2.1: US FSI(1).







b/y  EPVGBC(1) 
Figure 3.1: US b/y and exp[PVGBC(1)].












Figure 4.1: US PVs(1), PVdb(1) and PVrho(1).







PVv(1)  PVg(1) 
Figure 5.1: US PVv(1) and PVg(1).
(ii) Two year horizon










Figure 2.2: US FSI(2).








60 b/y  EPVGBC(2) 
Figure 3.2: US b/y and exp[PVGBC(2)].












Figure 4.2: US PVs(2), PVdb(2) and PVrho(2).







PVv(2)  PVg(2) 
Figure 5.2: US PVv(2) and PVg(2).
(iii) Five-year horizon









Figure 2.5: US FSI(5).






70 b/y  EPVGBC(5) 
Figure 3.5: US b/y and exp[PVGBC(5)].












Figure 4.5: US PVs(5), PVdb(5) and PVrho(5).











PVv(5)  PVg(5) 
Figure 5.5: US PVv(5) and PVg(5).
We observe that FSI(n),t h eﬁscal sustainability index, exceeds unity for any length of time
only during 1990’s. In the other periods it is either roughly equal to unity (also implying that
31the ﬁscal stance is sustainable) or less than unity (implying it is unsustainable). From 2001 the
FSI strongly indicates non-sustainability at each horizon. The FSI is also less than unity for the
period ending in 1989. The start date of this period depends on the time horizon. For one-year
and two-year horizons it is similar, consisting of most of the 1980’s, but for the ﬁve-year horizon
it extends back through the 1970’s, almost to 1965. Thus the 1990’s marked a period of ﬁscal
recovery which ended in around 2000.
Decomposing the index into its components, we ﬁnd that FSI < 1 for the period 1979-1994
when the debt-GDP ratio rose substantially. We also ﬁnd that variations in the present value of
forecast primary surpluses are the main determinant of ﬂuctuations in the index. The change in
debt target and the discount factor nearly oﬀset each other. This is because we have assumed a
constant discounted debt target and so the discount factor is the variable causing the change in
discounted debt term to ﬂuctuate.
The present values for expenditures and revenues are similar before 1995 but are diﬀerent
thereafter. In the period 1995-2001 the present value of revenues exceed those of expenditures
thereby producing a ﬁscal recovery. After 2001 the present value of expenditures exceed those of
revenues. This ﬁscal deterioration was due to a combination of rising expenditures and sharply
falling revenues. Fluctuations in the discount rate make an additional, but not large, contribution.
To summarize, there is clear evidence of a break in US ﬁscal policy from 2001 that has made
the ﬁscal stance unsustainable no matter the horizon over which we look. This was due to a
combination of a rising present value of expenditures and of sharply falling revenues. There have
been previous periods when the ﬁscal stance was also unsustainable, most notably from 1979-1994.
This was not fully corrected until the period 1995-2000 when the present value of expenditures
was reduced and was much lower than that of revenues.
6.2 The United Kingdom
The data are annual for the period 1970 to 2005 and are plotted in Figure 6.








































Figure 6: UK data
Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests are reported in Table 3. We conclude from these results that
ln
g
y and the real growth rate are stationary variables.
Table 3






y ln(1 + R)l n ( 1 + pi) ρ ∆lnyt
2 -2.349 -4.184** -2.416 -1.503 -1.267 -1.620 -3.600*
1 -2.432 -3.390* -3.194* -1.362 -1.768 -1.582 -4.595**
0 -1.400 -1.996 -2.250 -0.9936 -1.691 -1.757 -3.981**
Note: * denotes signiﬁcance at the 5% level and ** denotes signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
The results on ﬁscal sustainability are reported in Figures 7-10 for a one-year horizon.











Figure 7: UK FSI(1).









b/y  EPVGBC(1) 
Figure 8: UK b/y and exp[PVGBC(1)].











Figure 9: UK PVs(1), PVdb(1) and PVrho(1).







PVv(1)  PVg(1) 
Figure 10: UK PVv(1) and PVg(1).
We observe only two brief periods where FSI >1. These are 1986-1988 and 1997-2000. From
1971-1984 and after 2000 FSI <1 often by a considerable margin. The period 1984-2005 has four
35clear episodes. From 1984-1989 there were falls in the debt-GDP ratio and in both revenues and
expenditures in present value terms resulting in an improving ﬁscal position. This was a period
where privatization receipts were used to pay oﬀ debt, even though the assets were not included
in our measure of debt, namely, net government liabilities. From 1989-1992, when sterling left
the ERM, the ﬁscal position deteriorated sharply due to rising expenditures. This may even have
been a contributory factor in the speculation against sterling in 1992. After 1992 the debt-GDP
rose steadily as it did in the US, but expenditures after continuing to rise turned down which
caused an improvement in the ﬁscal stance. From 1996-2001 there was a marked improvement
in the ﬁscal position mainly due to rising revenues from the upturn in eceonomic activity. From
2001 the ﬁscal stance deteriorated again due to expenditures, which started to increase in 1998,
rising much more than revenues. The Chancellor of the Exchequer has said throughout his tenure
that the UK is meeting its ﬁscal targets, but this evidence indicates that this has not precluded
an obvious decline in UK ﬁscal sustainability.
6.3 Germany









































Figure 11: Germany data
The augmented Dickey-Fuller tests reported in Table 4 do not allow us to reject a unit root
for any of the variables
Table 4






y ln(1 + R)l n ( 1 + pi) ρ ∆lnyt
2 -1.315 -2.102 -1.653 -2.016 -1.355 -2.176 -2.515
1 -1.918 -2.080 -1.382 -1.645 -1.635 -2.850 -3.472*
0 -3.582* -2.017 -1.422 -5.303** -2.125 -3.431* -3.680*
Note: * denotes signiﬁcance at the 5% level and ** denotes signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
The results on ﬁscal sustainability for the period from 1977 are reported in Figures 11-15 for
a one-year horizon. The reason for starting in 1977 is that prior to this the debt-GDP ratio was
negative.







Figure 12: Germany FSI (1).







b/y  EPVGBC(1) 
Figure 13: Germany b/y and exp[PVGBC(1)].













Figure 14: Germany PVs(1), PVdb(1) and PVrho(1).







PVv(1)  PVg(1) 
Figure 15: Germany PVv(1) and PVg(1).
There has been a steady deterioration in the FSI over the whole period since 1977. There
were two occasions when the index worsened sharply. They are in 1989 on German uniﬁcation,
and again in 1999 shortly after EMU began. Both events seems to have been very harmful to
39the ﬁscal stance. Throughout the period the debt-GDP ratio has risen and, with the exception
of the period 1992-1999, the ﬁscal position has gradually deteriorated. The improvement during
the period 1992-1999 coincides with improvements in the US and UK and is due to sustained
economic growth raising tax revenues. Since expenditures also increased the improvement in the
German ﬁscal stance was less marked that those of the US and UK. Since 1999 the ﬁscal stance
has continued to worsen as expenditures, although falling over the period, have exceeded revenues
which have also decreased. The observed secular decline in German ﬁscal sustainability reﬂects
and supports the widespread perception that Germany is in need of structural reform.
7 Fiscal sustainability under changed monetary policy
We consider the eﬀect on ﬁscal sustainability of a counter-factual change of monetary policy so
that it follows the Taylor rule
rst =3+0 .5(lnyt − lnyT
t )+1 .5(πt − 2)
where lnyt − lnyT
t is the output gap and lnyT
t is taken to be a cubic function of time. We prefer
this measure of the output gap to the popular HP ﬁlter because the HP ﬁlter is two-sided and
hence causes the output gap to be a function of future output. This would cause a time distortion
to the VAR that is inappropriate for forecasting. Due to the presence of lagged variables, including
the output gap in the VAR together with ∆lnyt results in near perfect collinearity. Consequently
we use only the output gap and its lags. This does not aﬀect the explanatory power of the original
VAR or its forecasts.
The new equation for rst, which includes an intercept, is















We carry out the analysis of the eﬀects on ﬁscal sustainability of a change in monetary on annual
data for the US, the UK and Germany over a one-year horizon.
Figure 16 plots the observed nominal short-term interest rate together with the value given by
the Taylor rule for each of the three countries. For the US we ﬁnd that with the exception of the
period 1981-1986 the Taylor rule results in a higher interest rate. The diﬀerence is particularly
marked throughout the 1970’s and again from 2001. For the UK, Taylor rule interest rate is also
higher until 1980 but similar to the actual rate thereafter. For Germany, the Taylor rule gives a
lower interest rate during the 1980’s, but a similar rate thereafter.
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Figure 16: Taylor interest rate and IRS in the US, the UK and Germany.
417.1 The United States
Figures 17-20 plot the index and its components. Results based on the original VAR and the
policy modiﬁed VAR (PVAR) are depicted.






FSI(1)  FSI(P1) 
Figure 17: US FSI(1) for VAR and PVAR.












Figure 18: US b/y and exp[PVGBC(1)] for VAR and PVAR.











Figure 19: US PVs(1), PVdb(1) and PVrho(1) for VAR and PVAR.












Figure 20: US PVv(1) and PVg(1) for VAR and PVAR.
There is an improvement in the US ﬁscal stance throughout, except from 2001. The most
dramatic improvement occurs in the 1970’s when the Taylor rule gives much higher interest rates.
The cause of the improvement is lower expenditures and slightly higher revenues.
437.2 The United Kingdom
It is assumed that the real interest rate is 1% for the UK and not 3% as for the US. The results
are reported in Figures 21-24.








FSI(1)  FSI(P1) 
Figure 21: UK FSI(1) for VAR and PVAR.










Figure 22: UK b/y and exp[PVGBC(1)] for VAR and PVAR.















Figure 23: UK PVs(1), PVdb(1) and PVrho(1) - for VAR and PVAR.













Figure 24: UK PVv(1) and PVg(1) for VAR and PVAR.
Like the US, using a Taylor rule to determine UK monetary policy would have improved the
ﬁscal position in each year, but especially in the 1970’s, primarily by reducing expenditures in
present value terms.
457.3 Germany
Like the UK, the real interest rate was chosen as 1%. Figures 25-28 present the ﬁndings.
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Figure 25: Germany FSI(1) for VAR and PVAR.











Figure 26: Germany b/y and exp[PVGBC] for VAR and PVAR.











Figure 27: Germany PVs(1), PVdb(1) and PVrho(1) for VAR and PVAR.











Figure 28: Germany PVv(1) and PVg(1) for VAR and PVAR.
There is a moderate ﬁscal improvement for Germany that is much less than that for the US
and the UK. The greatest improvement occurs over the period 1988-1995 when the ﬁscal stance
becomes sustainable. After 2000 there is little diﬀerence between the two sets of results. The
47probable reasons for these ﬁndings are that German monetary policy was already tight and close
to following a Taylor rule prior to Germany joining EMU, and that this continued under ECB
interest rate policy.
8C o n c l u s i o n s
We state our conclusions brieﬂy. We have shown that existing ﬁscal sustainability measures
indicate whether the current policy stance is sustainable in the long run. We have argued that
for practical purposes this is not suﬃciently helpful and what is needed is a short-term indicator.
We have proposed the use of an index of ﬁscal sustainability. It can apply to any time horizon,
including a short time horizon and it is easy to compute automatically using a VAR. We have
shown how to identify individual components of the index that may be causing ﬁscal sustainability.
We have proposed a method that enables a VAR to be used after some of its equations have been
altered, in this case due to a change in policy. We have employed this procedure to analyse the
possible eﬀect on ﬁscal sustainability of a change in monetary policy so that it adheres to a Taylor
rule.
We have applied this methodology to three countries: the US, the UK and Germany. In the
U Ka n dU St h ei n d e xo fﬁscal sustainability has ﬂuctuated considerably with periods of non-
sustainability followed by periods of sustainability. During the period of strong economic growth
in the 1990’s the ﬁscal positions of all three countries improved considerably, but in recent years
the ﬁscal stance in all three countries has been steadily deteriorating. Our index indicates that a
continuation of the present ﬁscal stances is leading to ﬁscal unsustainability in the three countries.
We have shown that the German ﬁscal position has worsened steadily over the last thirty years
with only a brief respite in the mid 1990’s. A sharp deterioration occurred after uniﬁcation and
again on joining EMU.
A ﬁnding of non-sustainability should not be interpreted as implying that the ﬁscal stance
will remain unsustainable; it indicates that, in the absence of a more benign economic climate, a
48change of ﬁscal policy is required. We have shown that tighter monetary policy, particularly in
the 1970’s, would have improved the ﬁscal position and taken some of the pressure oﬀ ﬁscal policy,
but would not have much eﬀect on the current ﬁscal stances.
Finally, we note that this approach could also be applied to current account sustainablility.
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51Data appendix
The US data are quarterly for the period 1960.1 to 2005.4 and are taken from the OECD Eco-
nomic Outlook database and are described in the OECD Economic Outlook Database Inventory
and on the Annex Tables session of the Sources and Methods.
GDP, Value, at market prices, of gross domestic product;
GNFL, Value of government net ﬁnancial liabilities4 ;
PGDP,d e ﬂator of GDP at market prices;
GGINTP, Value of gross government interest payments;
GGINTR, Value of gross government interest receipts;
GNINTP, Value of net government interest payments5 ;
YPG T, Value of government total disbursement;
YR G T, Value of government total receipts;
IRS, Short-term nominal interest rate (in percentages)6 ;
IRL, Long-term interest rate (in percentages)7 .
The variables used in this study are then calculated as follows:
1. bt
yt is GNFL deﬂated by GDP.
2. vt
yt is YR G T minus GGINTR and deﬂated by GDP.
3.
gt
yt is YPG T minus GGINTP deﬂated by GDP.
4. Rt is GNINTP deﬂated by the GNFL in the previous period value
5. πt is the quarterly rate of change in the natural logarithm of PGDP.
4 This variable refers to the consolidated gross ﬁnancial liabilities of the government sector net of short-term
ﬁnancial assets, such as cash, bank deposits, loans to the private sector etc.
5 GGINTP = GNINTP − GNINTR
6 U.S. rates refer to interest rates on United States dollar three-month deposits in London, UK interest rates
are 3-month rates on interbank loans, while Germany interest rates refer to the 3-month FIBOR rate.
7 Rates refer to the ten-year government bond yield for the US and the UK, while they refer to the federal bond
y i e l di nt h ec a s eo fG e r m a n y .
526. rst is IRS divided by 100
7. rll is IRL divided by 100
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